Cronbach is one of the most important and least appreciated evaluation theorists. His work is almost never cited in European evaluation literature, outside some important corners in older work on educational evaluation (e.g. Simon, 1987) , and apart from the major review by Shadish et al. (1990) , his work is drawn on occasionally and selectively in the American literature and barely at all beyond those shores. Yet the work of this 'tough-minded master of conceptual distinctions' (Scriven, 1986: 15 ) is a brilliant tour de force, unusually rewarding if closely read, trenchant in analysis of the status quo, and creating truly unique alternatives sensitive to the scholarly need for general knowledge and the practitioner need for local application. (Shadish et al., 1990: 375) The key text for understanding Cronbach's position is the magisterial work by Cronbach and his colleagues in the Stanford network that preceded it (Cronbach et al., 1980) , 2 but his subsequent writing (Cronbach, 1982 (Cronbach, , 1986 complemented the main work. The key terms for negotiating his work are external validity; formative evaluation; evaluation within programmes; causation; generalisation; pluralist methodology; case study; and social behaviourism. While he writes largely from an educational perspective, Cronbach is almost the only theorist who has identified and lamented the damage done by the general absence of cross-border work between those who address evaluation-related problems in health, law, social welfare, and education. As he expressed it, 'Nobody can be a great economist who is only an economist . . . An economist who is only an economist is likely to become a nuisance if not a positive danger' (Cronbach, 1986: 97) . Indeed, Cronbach, while less known than names such as Campbell and Stake, may have stronger claim to holding a theory of evaluation than anyone, and one often marked by acerbic aversion to grand statements. Hence, If any single intellectual sin is responsible for the present chaos, it is the readiness to make general assertions that supposedly apply to all evaluations. (Cronbach et al., 1980: 51) Strategies for disciplined inquiry 3 Cronbach's suspicion of the general claim was the product of much else in his intellectual make-up, not least because he viewed research and evaluation as 'social inquiry for and by earthlings' (Cronbach, 1986) . 4 This was due in large part to his expectations regarding the policy, practice and citizen communities within which evaluation in the West is conducted. This makes it almost impossible -and I suspect undesirable -to disentangle his evaluation and political strategies.
I would characterise Cronbach's position as one of 'active gradualism.' Hence, evaluation's 'role is not to produce authoritative truths but to clarify, to document, to raise new questions, to create new perceptions ' (1980: 53) . 'This is the stance of a friendly critic, not of a person who sees the system as either beyond reproach or beyond repair ' (p. 157) . His position is to see evaluation as 'handmaiden to gradualism' (p. 158) -'(e)valuation is both conservative and committed to change' (p. 157).
Cronbach's work has methodological consequences. It pushes him towards evaluation within programmes rather than evaluation between programmes. He 'is dragged by his conception of social program realities toward methodologically looser conceptions of evaluation designs', and 'does not want a particular conception of scientific method to trivialize the process of asking important questions' (Shadish et al., 1990: 349) . He views evaluation design as a series of 'artful trade-offs ' (1980: 225) , which are not solely technical but part of political accommodation. 'Leverage is the bottom line. Leverage refers to the probability that the information -if believed -will change the course of events' (p. 265. Italics in original). For him, this was not an argument for an instrumental view of how evaluation will be used, because 'the questions with the greatest leverage are the ones that contribute to insight ' (p. 266) .
To achieve this local, contextualised understanding he rejects the notion of evaluation in which 'the program is to ''play statue'' while the evaluator's slow film records its picture ' (1980: 56) in favour of case studies drawing extensively but not exclusively on qualitative methods. He insists many times on the need for 'flexible attack' and 'does not want a particular conception of scientific methods to trivialise the process of asking important questions' (Shadish et al., 1990: 349) . 'Planning inquiry . . . is the art of recognising tradeoffs and placing bets ' (1986: 103) , and is typically a 'groping, inchoate activity ' (1980: 167) .
His pluralist view of methodology echoes his conception of the policy context in which evaluation is located. With characteristic dry wit he remarks, 'The very proposal to evaluate has political impact. To ask about the virtue of Caesar's wife is to suggest she is not above suspicion ' (1980: 163) . Cronbach and his colleagues complain that evaluation theory has 'been developed almost wholly around the image of command' and the assumption that managers and policy makers have a firm grip on the controls of decision making. However, 'most action is determined by a pluralistic community not by a lone decision-maker' (p. 84). Hence, evaluation enters a context of governance which is typically one of accommodation rather than command. On the contrary, they believe that 'most action is determined by a pluralistic community, not by a lone decision maker' (p. 84). 'A theory of evaluation must be as much a theory of political interaction as it is a theory of how knowledge is constructed' (pp. 52-53).
Having allowed that decisions rarely hinge solely on the empirical evidence, Cronbach is ready to trade off precision ('fidelity') against relevance ('bandwidth'). Cronbach has complained somewhere that evaluation researchers have been too prone to accept Type II errors (false negatives), out of a misreading of the risk of Type 1 errors (false positives). There are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our hypotheses, he would doubtless have said. He was hostile towards both goal-setting models of evaluation, and evaluation as accountability. ' We are uneasy about the close association of evaluation with accountability.
In many of its uses the word becomes an incantation and one that can cast a malign spell ' (1980: 133) . Cronbach, because he believed that evaluation is to be 'judged by its contribution to public thinking and to the quality of service provided subsequent to the evaluation' (p. 64), regarded accountability as a limited view of programme evaluation. 'Evaluation is not best used, we think, to bring pressure on public servants ' (1980: 17) . 'All too often, assignment of blame to individuals becomes the prime use of the accounts, while system improvement is forgotten' (p. 135). The evaluation then falls heavily on the wrong person. 'Accountability is most demanded of those public servants condemned to farm rocky ground, under capricious weather conditions' (p. 137). His conclusion is that a demand for accountability is a sign of pathology in the social system. Such a demand, each time it has occurred during the past century, has been a sign of discontent: those in charge of services are believed to be inefficient, insufficiently honest, or not self-critical. (p. 139) He regards the role of the evaluator as a multi-partisan advocator. I coin this term as a way of expressing a general failure in some social work writing to avoid binary simplifications of such positions as either critical/radical or whatever, or conservative. Applying the idea to the wider evaluation field, I would regard writers such as Scriven as wholly non-partisan. Cronbach, along with Stake, held multi-partisan positions. Ernest House -another evaluation scholar from whom social work would have much to gain -holds a reformist position, while writers such as Lather (not only an evaluation figure) hold radical partisan positions. For Cronbach, while the evaluator may serve some partisan interest 'his unique contribution is a critical, scholarly cast of mind' (p. 67). 'The evaluator holding up a mirror to events is an educator' (p. 160).
He sees evaluation within a context of political accommodation as both conservative and committed to change. As he explicitly expressed it, in negotiating the trade-offs of rigour and relevance Cronbach always prefers less dependable answers about a broader range of questions. 'Scientific quality is not the principal standard; an evaluation should aim to be comprehensible, correct and complete, and credible to partisans on all sides ' (1980: 11) . Hence, To be meliorist is the evaluator's calling. Rarely or never will evaluative work bring a 180-degree turn in social thought. Evaluation assists in piecemeal adaptations: perhaps it does tend to keep the status very nearly quo. (1980: 157) 'We emphasise not form of inquiry but relevance of information', because 'Under many circumstances, the emphasis on assessment of outcomes of a supposedly fixed program runs counter to the aims of understanding the problem and rendering better service ' (1980: 216) . Taking research and evaluation as accountability 'is both a limited view of the reasons for program success or failure and a limiting view of how evaluation can best be used to bring about improvement. Evaluation is not best used, we think, to bring pressure on public servants' (p. 17). Indeed, Cronbach believed that 'an evaluation of a particular project has its greatest implications for projects that will be put in place some time in the future ' (p. 267) . Policy values are too limited if we restrict a study's relevance to a programme now in place.
He and his colleagues were critical of injunctions to evaluate against clear and measureable goals, and reliable and objective measures which sustain internal validity. 'We do not consider it reasonable to separate the effects of the program from the rest of the client's experience.' Speaking of schools evaluation he says a 'program that appears superior to a rival program in isolation may be inferior when each program is embedded in the regular sequence of school experience' (p. 217). For example, 'After the experimenter with his artificial constraint leaves the scene, the operating program is sure to be adapted to local conditions' (p. 217).
Part of the problem is that 'ideas face an up-or-out decision much too early'. He insists 'progress requires that we respect poorly formed and even ''untestable'' ideas.' In a nice phrase he says, 'We should be stern only where it would cost us much to be wrong ' (1986: 86) .
He was not a policy science optimist. 'Social renovations disappoint even their architects -that is the iron law of social change ' (1980: 37) and 'In debates over controversial programs, liars figure, and figures often lie; the evaluator has a responsibility to protect his clients from both types of deception ' (p. 38 ). Yet '(w)e shall not advise the evaluator to avoid opportunities to be helpful; he is hired to improve public services, not to referee a basketball game' (p. 18). He is 'to act as a buffer between observers and political actors . . . not to censor their communications but to ripen them. The public should continue to hear many voices carrying discordant messages, but it would benefit if more speakers were disciplined by collegial discourse' (p. 71).
The larger the role of experts in governance, the more difficult it becomes for ordinary citizens to give direction to action . . . Insofar as information is a source of power, evaluations carried out to inform a policy maker have a disenfranchising effect .
. . An open society becomes a closed society when only the officials know what is going on. (p. 95)
They detect an historic tension between elitism and participation. 'The rationalist ideal of efficiency is in tension with the ideal of democratic participation. Rationalism is dangerously close to totalitarianism' (p. 95). It is 'rationalist to the point of unreality' to proceed on the basis that evaluation starts from agreement on goals (p. 129). All social programmes, he argued, have broad and vague goals, even supposedly targeted programmes. This is not escapism, as the rationalists would argue, but reflects the nature of programmes as operating within a climate of political accommodation. 'The first rule of the successful political process is, ''Don't force a specification of goals or ends ''' (p. 130) . In response to arguments that quasi-experimental designs are convincing and plausible, he and his colleagues say tartly that
The demand that an argument be 'convincing' is nothing more than a rationalist attempt to define a category of conclusions that in no way rest on belief and values; in evaluation it is an attempt to place decisions outside politics by establishing an inescapable conclusion. (p. 292) Information that is correct and comprehensive is no use if it is not credible and comprehensible. Thus the evaluator 'is not to see himself as a philosopher-king' and 'we advise him to respect the citizen's right to decide' (p. 72). In ways not wholly unlike Weber in his arguments regarding science as a vocation, when speaking of the evaluator as public scientist Cronbach and his colleagues suggest a set of personal values:
1. The evaluator should 'not attempt to evaluate a program with whose basic aims he is not in sympathy ' (p. 208) . In words that anticipate later writing on appreciative evaluation, they think that over-sympathy is much less a problem so long as there is a commitment to effective programmes. 2. Openness to good and bad news in data collection, and impartiality in interpretation. This is not the same as value-neutrality but by 'considering the facts from the relevant, no doubt conflicting, perspectives' (p. 209). 3. 'Having done his professional job, he puts off his professional robes and, if he chooses, speaks up for what he as a citizen favours' (p. 209). In doing so 'the fact that the evaluator can make some claim to be a neutral scientist helps him in fostering negotiation. If the investigator can keep the image of a reflective and disinterested observer, those with whom he interacts are under some pressure to speak reasonably themselves' (p. 183).
Cronbach on the uses of evaluation
It may help to bring together Cronbach's position on the uses of disciplined inquiry. His general position steers his arguments. His basic principle that a theory of evaluation must be equally a theory of political interaction as one of how knowledge is constructed, he took the position that 'Instead of promoting single definitive studies that promise unquestionable guidance on a narrow issue of policy, evaluators should be contributing to the slow, continuous cumulative understanding of a problem or intervention ' (1980: 47) . He was unhappy with the emphasis placed on summative evaluation. 'As we see it, evaluations are used almost entirely in a formative manner when they are used' (p. 62). They set their sights on future use as the value, saying 'Far more is to be learned from evaluation than a precise answer to an obsolete question' (p. 64).
They offer a framework for thinking about how evaluation use works by taking into account the relationship between the level of community agreement on values and the level of agreement about the facts of the matter (Figure 1 ).
Given their belief that 'It is the evaluator's task to illuminate, not to dictate, the decision' (p. 155), this illuminative stance sees evaluation not simply as providing information but working to deepen understanding, encourage questioning in order to make folk more tentative, raise sights to 'consider long-term possibilities as well as short-run advantages' (p. 161).
He exercises epistemological modesty when he says 'In my opinion, social science is cumulative, not in possessing ever-more-refined answers about fixed questions, but in possessing an ever-richer repertoire of questions ' (1986: 91) . 'We do not store up truths or laws. What social scientists mostly harvest are additional concepts and inquiry skills, along with careful records of events observed' (p. 104).
The argument for a social theory is more like argument for a political case than a natural science explanation, and 'Interpretations arising out of scholarship ought to be afforded the tolerance afforded to art' (p. 97).
Tellable stories
His overall position informed his ideals for communicative relationships between evaluators and stakeholders. The social work scientist -and evaluator -face a paradox. 'All research strives to reduce reality to a tellable story', but 'thorough study of a social problem makes it seem more complicated ' (1980: 184) . Their resolution of this paradox lies in the aphorism that comprehensive examination does not equal exhaustive reporting. 'When an avalanche of words and tables descends, everyone it its path dodges' (p. 186).
The main criterion is the extent to which relevant people learn from the evaluator's communications. Therefore, the evaluator should seek constant opportunity to communicate with the policy shaping community throughout the research. They believe that 'much of the most significant communication is informal, not all of it is deliberate, and some of the largest effects are indirect' (p. 174). Their recommendations are:
. Be around.
. Talk briefly and often.
. Tell stories. Always be prepared with a stock of anecdotes regarding the evaluation. . Talk to the manager's sources.
. Use multiple models of presentation. . Provide publicly defensible justifications for any recommended programme changes. These will be very different from scientific arguments.
Cronbach is strongly opposed to holding on until all the data is in and conclusions are firm. Influence and precision will be in constant tension, and if in doubt we should always go for influence. Live, informal, quick overviews, responsiveness to questions, the use of film and sound clips, and personal appearances, are the stuff of influence. The final report thus acts as an archival document.
The impotence that comes with delay . . . can be a greater cost than the consequences of misjudgement. The political process is accustomed to vigorous advocacy . . . (and) is not going to be swept off its feet by an ill-considered assertion even from an evaluator. (pp. 179-180)
Validity and evaluation
The motifs of what we have come to accept as orthodox controlled experimental designs, and through that to randomised control trials, are inference from the internal validity of evaluations, and assessment of outcomes through summative comparisons of alternative programmes. Cronbach gives priority to neither of these. In his intellectual context, this set him against Donald Campbell and Michael Scriven. Against Campbell he argues the priority of external validity, and contrary to Scriven he advocates formative evaluation -evaluation within and not between programmes.
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At the core of Cronbach's position is the claim that '''external validity'' -validity of inferences that go beyond the data -is the crux of social action, not ''internal validity ''' (1980: 231) . Behind this lies a particular view of causation. For Campbell, internal validity is about the relationship between interventions and outcomes in a given random sample. Cronbach considers this concept insignificant -'Campbell's writings make internal validity a property of trivial, past tense, and local statements ' (1982: 137) . 'This is a report on a local historical event, not a conclusion about a recurrent relation ' (1980: 314-315 ). Cronbach prioritises the understanding and explanation of mechanisms operating in a local context, in order that plausible inferences can be drawn regarding other settings, people and interventions that are of interest to policy makers. It is extrapolation that matters -'a prediction about what will be observed in a study where the subjects or operations depart in some respect from the original study ' (1986: 94) . It is not 'before-and-after', but 'during-during-during', as he somewhere says.
Thus, it is external and construct validity that matter. And to this end evaluation can provide the credible, plausible and probable -but not the necessary evidence. He refers back to his influential paper with Paul Meehl on construct validity (Cronbach and Meehl, 1955) written 'just before Popper took over the lead ' (1980: 85) . While he does not want to abandon their argument he thinks that 'Taken as a whole . . . the paper devalued conjectural interpretations ' (p. 86) .
Rejecting the idea of causation as events that can be predicted with a high degree of probability, Cronbach developed twin arguments. First, he argued that causes are contingent on local interactions of clusters of events. More than one cluster may be sufficient, but no one cluster is necessary. Second, he accepted that there are usually missing events or conditions that effect the outcome of a given programme, but about which we know little. 6 He was the first theorist to produce a plausible explanation of contextual factors in evaluation. We observed that in his emphasis on the artificial constraints of the experimenter. He went as far as to say that 'a programme evaluation is so dependent on its context that replication is only a figure of speech ' (p. 222) .
Later writers have accepted that qualitative evaluation cannot resolve the problems of causal conclusions any more easily than quantitative evaluation, but it can assess causality 'as it actually plays out in a particular setting' (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 10) . Cronbach argued to similar effect that we need causal explanatory knowledge, 'not knowledge of things that work on average under a set of diverse conditions' (Shadish et al., 1990: 363) . Taking Cronbach's two arguments about causation together, the experimental intervention is neither necessary nor sufficient for the predicted effect to occur. An experiment cannot provide a critical test for the effectiveness of a programme. The traditional formulation 'is not the world of social programmes and, in general, is not the social world at all' (House, 1993: 135) . Hence, '''External validity'' -validity of inferences that go beyond the data -is the crux of social action, not ''internal validity''' (1980: 231) . Internal validity gains may be feasible 'to some extent, but relevance is likely to suffer' (p. 231). While always favouring relevance over precision, they do not see them as choices.
An internally valid study is one in which the ''statistician's conclusion'' -the inference from [sample] to [population] -is beyond challenge. That ideal is most surely achieved by a comparative experiment with controlled assignment. Internal validity can claim priority when the investigator addresses a summative and causal question, not otherwise. This is the position of all Campbell's writings on the subject, but it becomes explicit only at the end of the . . . Cook and Campbell monograph (1979 . . .) : ''Though random assignment is germane to the research goal of assessing whether the treatment caused any observed effects, it is conceptually irrelevant to all other research goals''.
Internal validity, however, is not of salient importance in an evaluation. What counts in evaluation is external validity, that is, the plausibility of conclusions about one or another. (p. 314) Taken together with the work of House and Campbell, Cronbach provides a wellanchored platform for causal inferences through qualitative evaluation. Programmes are not fixed entities which 'play statue' (in Cronbach's phrase), but vary from site to site. Causes are discovered by knowledge of particulars -'evaluation approaches that expect and track variability and irregularity of events' (House, 1991: 8) .
Placing Lee Cronbach
Not wishing to categorise, I would identify Cronbach as part of a broad position that we may call 'social behaviourism' -a term borrowed from George Herbert Mead 'and applied to the whole school of which Mead occupied only one branch' (Martindale, 1961: 285) . It entailed a behavioural definition of the materials of social science, a pluralistic behavioural approach, and was influenced by pragmatism with its conception of the instrumental nature of ideas and truth.
There are limiting aspects to Cronbach's theory. His concern with large scale policy and programme evaluation makes his ideas less readily transferable to evaluation of local projects and practices. His pluralist political stance was fashioned prior to the advent of right wing market policies and will be unacceptable to some readers. But his evaluation model would provide a welcome astringent in the context of the wave of populist movements at the time this review is written. His context-aware approach gave him sensitivity to the possibility that his arguments may need to be revisited. Indeed, he remarked, with the irony that 21st-century hindsight affords, that 'Our theses will have to be revised to fit the United States of the year 2000 ' (1980: 14) . It fell to the symbolic interactionists, with their stress on self and meaning, to open up the linguistic structuring of inter-human behaviour.
Yet his influence proved varied, touching contemporaries as diverse as Patti Lather, Helen Simon and Bob Stake, and gaining respect from those with whom he disagreed. I have tried to spell out ways in which his work has extensive implications for key aspects of qualitative research, including generalisation, causal explanations, case studies, and the uses and policy relevance of evaluation.
For example, in a modified version of Cronbach's argument, the audience for evaluation consists of public servants and the public. Public servants include elected members, policy officials, responsible programme officials, and operating personnel, such as teachers, social workers, nursing staff, and housing managers. The relevant public for a programme includes the immediate constituencies of the programme clientele, and those Cronbach describes as illuminators (e.g. reporters, academics, some novelists and dramatists, media commentators). We might also include the major lobbying groups which in some cases may be close to public servant roles (arm's length political 'think tanks', or non-governmental organisations, for example), and in other cases more associated with illuminators (as in the example of lobbying groups for the homeless). It is important to recognise that the policy-shaping community will expand and contract according to both the issue and the phase of any programme.
His analyses and prescriptions were far from easy, either to assimilate or embody in evaluation practice. But it is at the level of his intellectual strategy where the fundamental challenge of his work lies. In one sense it matters less whether one agrees with him, and more with the extent to which one recognises and explores the 'tough-minded' challenges posed by his work.
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